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I
n 1996, an award-winning documentary about child labor in the Philippines
was shown on national television. The documentary, entitled Minsan lang
sila bata, featured movingly how a semblance of childhood could be lost
because of child labor.1 It aimed to present the sad plight of child laborers,
grim realities of child labor, and to stir up the sensibilities of the viewing public,
who, perhaps, were largely unmindful of this distressing reality.
Economic theory emphasizes the important role of human capital, among
others, in furthering and sustaining economic growth or economic development. It
is not without basis to say that Philippine economic development will be
anchored, in part, on the quality of the economy’s current and future human
infrastructures. The operational word is quality, which presupposes and
necessitates an educated, well-trained or highly skilled human resource.
The absence of this quality will definitely have a detrimental impact on future
productivity. In light of these positions, therefore, this question then begs to be
asked: Does the prevalence of child work or child labor encumber on the country’s
economic growth and development?
This paper looks into the reality that is child labor and tries to understand its
existence in light of education realities and schooling issues in the Philippines. It
attempts to answer the aforesaid question through the investigation on the
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seeming tradeoff between child labor and schooling, and through the exploration
of the impacts of this tradeoff in both the short term and long term.
The exploration and discussion of other determinants of child labor is
beyond the purview of this paper.
The first section discusses current statistics about the incidence of child
labor considering the 1995 and 2001 surveys of children. The second section sets
the parameters regarding the operational definition of child labor in the Philip-
pines. The third section reviews the literature on child work, focusing on factors
that lead households to choose child work vis-à-vis schooling.
The fourth section discusses the theoretical framework, which is essentially
a household model on the determinants and causes of child labor. The fifth section
presents methodological framework and the two-stage model employed in the
empirical investigation. The sixth section discusses the institutional setting
considering schooling issues and the data employed in the empirical inquiry. The
seventh section presents the results of the econometric analyses, and the last
section, the summary and recommendations.
THE INCIDENCE OF CHILD WORK: 1995 AND 2001
The National Statistics Office conducted two surveys of children, which provided
a comprehensive sketch of the plight of child workers in the Philippines. The first
one was conducted in 1995 while the second in 2001. A detailed discussion of
information presented and gleaned from the two surveys will not be done in this
paper. Nevertheless, key trends about the incidence of child work will be looked into.
The incidence of child work in the Philippines has not changed much. The
most recent survey in 2001 revealed that four million working children aged 5 to 17
years old constituted 16.17 percent of the total age-group population, while 3.6
million working children represented 15.98 percent of the total age-group popula-
tion in 1995. The incidence of female child workers had increased by 0.74 percent
over the six-year period; males, however, experienced a decrease by 36 percent.
Although the incidence of child work in 2001 was marginally higher than that in
1995, the absolute number of child workers grew by about 12 percent during the
period, or about 2 percent annually. The most economically active children were
found in the 10 to 17 age range for both survey periods. Regarding the distribution
by sex, about 6 of 10 working children were males. This proportion was rather
consistent during the two periods. Nevertheless, the number of female child
workers had been growing at a faster rate of about three percent annually. In
addition, child labor continued to be a rural phenomenon as about 7 of 10 working
children in the 5 to 17 age group resided in rural areas in 2001. This proportion was
marginally higher than in 1995, with around 6 of 10 working children residing in
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CHILD LABOR DEFINITION
Not all child work is considered as child labor, and one must be cognizant of
the parameters in defining child labor. The operational definition of child labor
employed in this paper incorporates both national and international definition
regarding child labor, particularly the definition as stipulated in Republic Act
No. 7658 (amending Republic Act No. 7610 of 1992), the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) Department Order No. 4 Series 1999, and Article 3 of
International Labour Organization (ILO) Order No. 4 Series 1999.
Incorporating the domains of both national and international definitions
leads one to reduce the parameters to three important considerations: (1)
hazards faced by the child; (2) age; and (3) parental supervision (Alonzo and
Edillon 2002; Table 2). Operationally, all child workers engaged in occupa-
tions characterized as the “worst form,” based on Article 3 of ILO Convention
182, are child laborers. The worst forms of child labor are all occupations that
undermine the general welfare and the long-term development of a child. Age
is a secondary consideration regarding child labor. Child work not categorized
as the “worst form” will still be considered as child labor if the child is below
15 years old and not supervised by his or her parents at work. A child works
outside parental supervision if he or she works for a private household other
than his or her own; works for a private establishment; works for the govern-
ment or a government corporation; and is self-employed. Thus, aside from
the nature of the work and child’s age, the type of employment relations (i.e.,
with or without parental supervision) is also important in the consideration
of child labor.
Table 1. Working children 5-17 years old: by sex, 1995 and 2001
Philippines 22,381,517 100.00 24,850,943 100.00 1.76
   Working 3,577,363 15.98 4,017,886 16.17 0.19 1.95
   Nonworking 18,804,153 84.02 20,833,057 83.83 1.72
Male 11,523,148 100.00 12,830,232 100.00 1.81
   Working 2,329,556 20.22 2,547,666 19.86 -0.36 1.50
   Nonworking 9,193,592 79.78 10,282,566 80.14 1.88
Female 10,858,368 100.00 12,020,711 100.00 1.71
   Working 1,247,807 11.49 1,470,220 12.23 0.74 2.77
   Nonworking 9,610,561 88.51 10,550,491 87.77  1.57
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DETERMINANTS OF CHILD LABOR
Determinants of child labor in the Philippines can be generally categorized as
either economic or sociocultural. Although economic factors can be considered as
circumscribing the social factors at play, it is important to note that these factors
are interrelated and not entirely mutually exclusive. Another strand in the litera-
ture analyzes child labor determinants within the immediate environment of the
child or the household level (micro), in the community and even regional level
(meso) and in the national and international level (macro). The literature presents
a skein of interrelated factors that contribute to the incidence of child labor.
Expectedly, the apparent complexity and interrelations of the determinants of child
labor have many-sided consequences on the child. This review of the literature
does not intend to present a full discussion on the determinants of child labor.
Some determinants, however, will be explored and discussed in light of the
decision to abandon schooling altogether for work or the relationship between
child labor and schooling.
Children are forced or pressured to work, interfering with their education
and exposing them to health risks, because of poverty. Case studies cited in
del Rosario and Bonga (2000), and more recent studies by Lim (2001), Alonzo
and Edillon (2002), Esguerra (2002), Sta. Maria and Chiongson (2002) and
Villamil (2002) put poverty to the fore as the foremost determinant of child labor
in the Philippines.2
Child labor statistics reveal that poverty incidence among families with child
laborers was about twice the national incidence rate. Furthermore, 85 percent of
children engaged in child labor were found in rural areas, and most of these
children were found in Northern Mindanao, with about 22 percent child labor
incidence (Alonzo and Edillon 2002). Income from child labor, therefore, is
welcome to very low-income households notwithstanding the setting. Child labor
2 There are enough case studies and anecdotes in the documentations of ILO/IPEC regarding child labour
and poverty.
Table 2: Operationalization of the definition in the Philippines
Source: Alonzo and Edillon 2002
Child Laborer Child Worker
Worst Form Not in Worst Form
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is necessary for the survival of the household as resources and economic oppor-
tunities are not sufficient to meet the household’s minimum basic needs.
Related to poverty is the lack or absence of economic opportunities in the
household’s localities. Año (2002) studied the situation of child labor in the
pyrotechnics industry. He finds that there are no other viable enterprises that can
serve as livelihood sources for the community, thus the alternative to engage in a
rather dangerous work. Edralin’s (2002) indepth studies on the situations of
children in the pyrotechnics industry and prostitution maintain that limited
economic opportunities impel children to engage in these worst forms of child
labor. Brillantes (1996) also mentions that employment of children in domestic
service is spurred by their impoverished households, and children who participate
in domestic service come from economically depressed regions and provinces in
the Philippines, which are characterized by lack of income-earning opportunities.
The lack or absence of income-providing economic opportunities pushes the
already poor household down to deeper poverty.
Poverty and the high cost of education for poor families are reasons
mentioned in the literature why children of poor households do not attend school.
Poor households simply cannot afford to send their children to school even with
free primary and secondary education. This is because attendant costs of sending
children to school may even be too much for a low-income household. Another
reason which Edralin (2002) mentions in her study was the lack of access to schools.
Particularly in rural areas, the distant location of schools relative to the child’s
place of work or dwelling becomes a factor to consider.
It is important to point out the mutual feedback between lack of education
and child labor and the vicious cycle of low levels of education and child labor,
which resonate to future generations. Heads of poor households are likely to have
low levels of education and, often, household poverty can be ascribed to house-
hold heads’ having low educational attainment. Statistics corroborate the afore-
said as Alonzo and Edillion (2002) report that heads of families of child laborers
were males aged 25 to 64 years. About 60 percent of the head of the families went
beyond the elementary level and about 10 percent of them finished high school.
Interestingly, Lim (2001) points out that the educational levels of the parents,
household head or mother of the family have a strong bearing on the poor
household’s dilemma to send children to school or to allow, or even force, the
children to work. Villamil (2002) provides evidence through probit regressions for
the Philippines. His analysis of the results suggests that low educational level of
the household head contributes strongly to the probability of a child both working
and not going to school.
The hand-to-mouth existence (Lim 2002) of poor households implies that
without a strong value for education, lowly educated household heads willPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 220
definitely prefer child labor to schoolwork because it augments household
income. The need to survive on a day-to-day basis far outweighs the long-term
benefit of education. In addition, Villamil (2002) finds that, based on the estimated
earnings functions of adult workers (operationally defined as those 15 years and
above), the differentials in earnings between primary school graduates and
secondary school graduates, especially in the rural and agricultural sector, were
very small and marginal. Thus, many poor families opt for their children to work
rather than proceed to high school because of low returns to education.
Moreover, the values systems of parents may be a factor regarding children’s
engagement in market work. It is safe to say that values systems are largely shaped
and determined by education. Ignorance and lack of information, which may lead
to distorted values, result in decisions that are not always in the best interest of
children. Distorted values may bring about a higher probability of child labor.
Edralin (2002), in her study of children in prostitution, points to the values sys-
tems inculcated by the child from the family or even the community as a contribu-
tory factor to his or her decision to engage in prostitution. This is because the
child is expected to support the family particularly during difficult economic or
social situations. Arcilla (2002) adds that prostituted children may hold the belief
that young people should be subservient in the family. Other practices make chil-
dren believe that making money by selling their bodies is not an issue.
Moreover, lack of education may distort the line of reasoning of parents
such that children may be regarded as a form of social insurance, particularly
in poor households. Jacoby and Skofias (1994) regard child labor as a hedge
against risk and uncertainty, an insurance against unforeseen losses in income
that may threaten the survival of the household. Child labor therefore is a
good recourse, as a child laborer becomes an insurance against fluctuations
and losses in adult income.
Regarding children as a form of insurance looks to the “short-term time
horizon” of many poor families, who have limited or no savings at all and have no
assets which will ultimately allow them to have access to credit (Lim 2002; Villamil
2002). Thus, having more children and allowing and even forcing children to
engage in work is a risk-reducing strategy for most poor families and underscores
that the daily need for subsistence is more immediate and of paramount concern.
In economic jargon, intense poverty shrinks the time horizon of households to the
short run. This means that households are willing to forego future income for
current consumption; thus, future benefits have very little value to households
whose immediate concern is survival. In the review of recent empirical studies, a
key solution to child labor is the provision of liquidity to poor households.
High fertility rate or high dependency burden may have indirect effects on
child schooling. Lloyd (1994) suggested that a larger household size reduces theALDABA, LANZONA AND TAMANGAN 221
investment of parents in education of children and, therefore, increases the likeli-
hood that children will engage in market work. Thus, high fertility rates among the
poor, which in turn leads to high dependency burden among poor families, will
likely result in higher incidence of child labor. Villamil (2002) using probit regres-
sions for the Philippines reveal that the probability of going to school and not
working is negatively and strongly related to the number of children in the family
aged 0 to 4 years and to the number of children aged 5 to 14. In addition, the
probability of not going to school and working is positively and significantly
related to the number of children aged 0 to 9 years. These findings suggest a social
reality in the Philippines that older children of poor households engage in child
labor to support their younger siblings.
There is universal agreement in the literature about the negative impact of
child labor on the education of a child laborer. Child labor interferes with school
attendance and school performance and increases the probability that the child
becomes a school dropout. In the medium and long run, this leads to low educa-
tion and skills and low capacity to earn, thus bringing about the mutual feedback
between child labor and education in the medium and long runs. As a case in point,
de Vries et al. (2001) reports that children working in the pyrotechnics industry feel
exhausted at the end of the day after long hours of work in a squatting or standing
position. Children lose their interest in schoolwork because of the psychological
benefits of earning their own income. In addition, their overtime work does not
make it possible for them to continue their studies.
Alonzo and Edillon (2002) provide evidence to the aforementioned, reveal-
ing that school participation decreases with age of the child laborers. “About 53
percent of the surveyed child laborers do not attend school. School participation
among child laborers aged 5 to 12 was about 80 percent. This drops to 60 percent
by age 13 and to 22 percent by age 17.”
Child labor is basically the short-run coping mechanism of poor families
during times of crises. The child is considered as insurance during desperate
situations because of the lack or weak social protection programs in the commu-
nity and in the macroeconomy, by and large. In the medium and long run, the
practice of child labor provides a coping mechanism of the poor and disadvan-
taged in a community and society that is wanting in economic development and
social protection.
The negative consequences of child labor experienced in the household
level, resonates on the aggregate level and in the long run. The costs of foregone
education and the lack of skills acquisition and health, emotional and psycho-
logical damages will surely have an effect on current and future efficiency and
productivity. As it were, work abuses likely result in psycho-emotional problems
experienced by the child laborer, which leads to stunted economic growth in thePHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 222
medium and long run, psychological and emotional problems and incapacity,
dysfunctional behavior and sometimes criminality.
It is important to stress that the literature on child labor underscores that
on the macroeconomic level, the long-term effect of child labor are the per-
petuation of low education and poverty, and the negative externalities of low
education, poor health, and poor psycho-emotional development of these
children (Lim 2002; Villamil 2002).
Macroeconomic, endogenous growth theory argues that the contribution
of quality human capital to economic development results in increasing returns
to scale and positive externalities for economic development and sustained
growth (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988). Lim (2002) says that Child labor leads to
reduction in human capital and reduction in skilled and educated labor, a reduc-
tion in healthy and productive labor, and a reduction in the quality of the labor
force by reducing socialization and interpersonal skills. High incidence and
prevalence of child labor, therefore, leads to massive productivity and efficiency
losses in the medium- and long-term. The high incidence of child labor creates a
sort of hysteresis—a quicksand, which drags the economy and society down to
lower and non-optimal growth paths.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Determinants of completed family size and household labor allocation operate
through a household preference for present and future consumption, children and
human capital, and through three constraints. These three constraints are:
✦ the budget constraint that reflects the opportunities and limitations
implied by the market prices of goods and services, the wage rate of
family members and any nonlabor income, and time at the disposal of
household members;
✦ the household technology, which enables it to convert market goods
and the time of the family members into basic commodities, including
food consumption and human capital; and
✦ the household’s budget that is dependent on the children’s future
production and income and the income of the resources that were
bequeathed by the parents. This last constraint pertains to the
intergenerational aspect of household decisions.
Figure 1 presents the parent-child dynamics and the general equilibrium
model of household decisions. The model assumes that parents make rational
choices, which determine the household’s welfare and future security and,
ultimately, the economy’s productivity and growth. The possible choice of
sending children to work is part of these decision-dynamics.ALDABA, LANZONA AND TAMANGAN 223
Figure 1. A general model of household decisionsPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 224
Three different factors represent the aforementioned constraints. These
factors are:
✦ the invariable genetic structure and background of the family;
✦ the relatively short-run macroeconomic environment; and
✦ the more long-run local (meso and micro) conditions where the family
resides and that ultimately determine the human capital of the house-
hold, including education.
Analyses and identification of determinants of child labor are made difficult
because of perceived cyclical relationships between outcomes and factors, i.e.
outcomes determine the conditions that initially lead to such outcomes. Broken
lines in the diagram show heuristically how final outcomes, such as children’s
productivity or parents’ economic security, reinforce and perpetuate adverse
conditions at the local and national levels. The new generation’s productivity or
parents’ security in general will be undermined by the parents’ decision for child
work. Thus, given the feedback process, the households’ demand for children
increases as long as poverty remains.
The short-run effects of macroeconomic policies are particularly important
for two main reasons: their effects on prices affecting the opportunity costs of
children and their effects on household’s and investment behavior. Moreover,
these effects directly influence the parents’ preferences and expectations, espe-
cially in terms of increasing wage rates. Short-run conditions can also be deter-
mined by long-run conditions as macroeconomic stability raises returns from hu-
man capital or the expected wage rates of children.
The welfare of parents and children are inextricably linked in the model.
While children depend on their parents for upbringing, parents can also rely on
their children for their present and future income. Nowadays, with the increase in
human expected life span, adult social security becomes an increasingly important
issue in light of child labor, among others, as it can exacerbate the dependence of
poor families on child labor to augment household incomes. Nevertheless, parents
may be induced to substitute quantity for quality, opting for more investments in
education to realize greater productivity in the future, given improvements in
economic growth and the associated changes in the economic structure.  A static
local economy, therefore, opens the avenues for the use of child labor, which is
self-enforcing or self-equilibrating. The point is the increase in present income
from child labor presumably overcomes the current production constraints of
households, but in turn may result in lower future labor productivity and lower
wages for the children.
Improving access to schooling facilities in local communities has three key
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higher level of welfare. Firstly, schooling induces technological innovations
that raise the rate of return to human capital. Improved technological conditions
ease households’ current budget constraints, allowing parents to have more
resources at their disposal to invest in their children. It is important to note that
the adoption of modern technology depends on the availability of human capital,
and returns to child-quality rise given technological improvements that are
induced by quality human capital. This aforesaid situation has a positive effect on
growth, and it argues against the child-quantity option as a means to augment
household incomes.
Secondly, an educated and quality workforce is realized with access to
schooling, and an educated workforce is likely to be highly associated with
higher productivity. Greater production in the local economy means lesser time to
recover costs of human capital investments, which raises returns of other forms of
human capital. Note that a low return to education is not a consequence of
unprofitable educational outcomes but of the poor access to education.3  With
access to education and its attendant higher future productivity for child
workers, poorer households are less likely to allow their children to engage
in child work because of high opportunity costs of child work.
Thirdly, improved access to schooling leads to greater access to funds and
capital. As the productivity increases, opportunities for both men and women
become greater, and the dependence on child labor is ultimately reduced. In the
process, the increased productivity of labor leads to an increased productivity
of capital. Without the increase in labor productivity, any increase in capital
eventually leads to diminishing marginal returns.
The incorporation of household capital, a fixed factor of production, into
this basic model serves as a unifying component that is consistent with the
overall view of controlling child labor. Since the existing stock of adult labor
were unskilled and unproductive, and since capital were scarce, then child labor
would be the only other factor left to raise production. Further, capital formation
will be limited because capital investment requires a modicum of labor productivity
or technological improvements. Moreover, since land is fixed, the increasing
use of child labor reduces the land-labor ratio, thereby resulting in lower wage
rates. However, with greater use of capital, the decline in the wage rates will be
minimized if capital is also used in raising labor productivity. Thus, changes in
capital in the short-run serve as the basis for a unified model that completes
the transition from an equilibrium with “inefficient” child labor to an equilibrium
3 Lanzona (1998a) shows that the returns to education are lower in communities where the educated
individuals have migrated outside. This means that the returns to education will be higher if the decision
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without child labor.4  With more physical capital, the prevalent demand for chil-
dren as a productive input for both present and future income is minimized.5 It is
important to note that capital accumulation should not be used to substitute for
long-term increases in labor productivity. Capital should be seen as complemen-
tary to labor inputs since fertility reductions are always grounded on improving
the returns to human capital.
More importantly, the model highlights the crucial role that schooling de-
cisions have in determining the causes and consequences of child labor. The
family decides to reduce the schooling of their children for a number of reasons.
For one, the cost of schooling may be too high. While the primary and secondary
schooling are supposed to be free, there are other incidental costs such as
allowances, transportation, among others, that may make schooling too expen-
sive. However a more compelling reason is that returns to education may be too
low relative to opportunity costs of sending children to school. In other words,
future (net) returns of education are viewed to be lower than the wage that is
offered in the market.6
The problem here is not so much the labor markets but the imperfect capital
markets that are unable to evaluate the returns to education. Given more access to
credit, the households could have properly allocated their resources to allow their
children to go to school. Because of imperfect credit markets, as is the case in most
developing countries, child labor arising from lack of access to schooling is seen
to be inefficient. In this case, the outright banning of child labor without improv-
ing access to schooling is also seen to be inefficient. Households’ decision to
supply child labor is to some extent a response to the existing constraints and a
matter of survival.
In summary, the conceptual framework’s main focus is that the household
decision to send children to work (the supply of child labor) is influenced by
various factors at the macro (national), meso (local and community) and micro
(household) levels. For the macro determinants, weak economic policies and
4 This is because child labor is used as a second best response to a market failure, e.g. lack of capital
and credit markets.
5 The usual view is to consider children as labor input. What differentiates child labor from adult labor is
the need to invest in children’s development to make them productive inputs. Parents will initially have
to endow children with resources, a condition, which is unnecessary in hiring additional adult labor.
6 Lanzona (1998b) notes that, in Bicol, the greater the value the family places in irrigated land, the greater
is the investment in the schooling of sons, holding constant for the parent’s education and community
school infrastructure. One hypothesis for this pattern is that the major irrigation projects in the Bicol Region
in 1970s facilitated the adoption of profitable high yielding varieties. Where these new agricultural inputs
and education held the most immediate promise, families invested more to educate their sons, preparing
them to evaluate and profitably adopt the newly induced production possibilities. The education received
by the daughters on the other hand prepared them for employment in nonagricultural activities.ALDABA, LANZONA AND TAMANGAN 227
programs result in low employment levels and incomes (and high underemploy-
ment) resulting in extreme poverty situations. Aggravating this is weak social
service delivery and safety nets, which, if adequate, could have cushioned certain
sectors of the population from economic risks and vulnerabilities. In addition, the
failure to formulate effective population policies and programs has increased
dependency burdens of households, which in turn raise the probability of child
work. The inadequacies of the educational system and the lack of credit markets
also affect the decision to send children to work. Most of these macro factors also
operate at the local and community levels and affect the supply of child labor. The
consequences of the household decision to send children to work are divided into
the short-term and long-term effects. Included in the former are schooling and
health effects plus psychological trauma and lowering of self-esteem. Long-run
effects include lower productivity of these children leading to the perpetuation of
poverty and “income insecurity” of parents and other negative externalities result-
ing from poor education and health.
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
The empirical model considers a household utility maximization problem over
arguments that are of interest. Hence, child schooling is not assumed as an invest-
ment good (in the standard Beckerian approach), but instead as an argument of the
utility function. Nonetheless, the interpretation of this assumption should be broader
in the sense that education is expected to generate income in the long-run, that is,
one can regard this demand for schooling as a demand for quality children.7
The household’s decision to send children to school depends on its wage
and the amount of subsidies given by the government. To simplify the model on
child work, one assumes that children do not work when they are in school.
Suppose that the child can have at the maximum 14 years of schooling, and that he
or she can devote 14 years of schooling if he or she receives the subsidies coming
from the state. Assuming that schooling starts at age seven, the present value of
the amount of money the child needs if he or she takes this option is thus
where Bi refers to the amount of benefits received at age i, and r is the discounting
factor. In other words, if the child begins schooling at age seven and decides to
take 14 years of schooling, the family may be able to purchase PV7  pesos
7 Nevertheless, the idea of schooling as a consumption good is not contradicted by ethnographic
evidence. There is a large amount of anecdotal evidence showing that for some households schooling is
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worth of consumption goods. In lieu of subsidies, the household can also be
given access to some form of assets (including credit) which in turn provide
incomes and in effect internally “subsidize” the child’s schooling.
As an alternative, the child can choose to never study and participate in the
labor market for 14 years. The present value of the child’s income stream, starting
from age seven, is equal to the discounted sum of labor earnings or the opportu-
nity costs of schooling:
where Wi gives the child’s labor earnings at age i. If the child never goes to school,
he or she can purchase PV20 pesos worth of consumption goods.
Suppose that PV20 > PV7 , i.e., incomes are greater when the child is
working than when the child is in school.8  The worker can then choose to
study at any age between 7 and 20. He or she would receive labor earnings
while employed and schooling subsidies when he or she is in school. By
calculating the present value of the incomes associated with each age, one
can derive the child worker’s “budget line.” This budget line indicates that if
the worker wants to achieve more schooling, he or she will have to give up
some goods. Given this tradeoff, one can determine the child’s optimal
number of schooling by introducing his or her utility between schooling and
consumption. The worker maximizes utility by choosing level of schooling,
and this then indicates whether he or she will participate in the labor market
or not.
A central factor in this model for schooling is the availability of subsi-
dies and accessibility to assets that will induce greater incomes and reduce
opportunity costs of not schooling. As an income effect, the increase in
these factors expands the child’s opportunity set, increasing the demand for
schooling. As a substitution effect, increases in these factors reduce the
price of schooling as the difference between the earning received from school-
ing and not schooling is decreased. This discourages the child from working.
Thus, an increase in the accessibility to schooling, through subsidies or
household assets, leads to a longer schooling period. The absence of such
subsidies will force households to look for some other form of earnings to
spend for their consumption.
Empirically, this model suggests the following two-stage model where the
families first decide the amount of schooling, and recursively chooses the level of
8 This assumption is reasonable assumption since the child worker’s salary is typically greater than the
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child work, given the schooling decision.9 The decision for child labor depends
mainly on the labor market conditions. Children decide whether to participate in
the labor market or not depending on how their reservation wages compare with
the given market wage rates net of the costs of transacting in the labor market.
Their reservation wages in turn are determined by individual and household char-
acteristics, including the assets that the parents have already invested earlier in
their schooling.
Based on the above framework, the following equations will be used in the
estimation:
where Si and  Li refer to some index of the child’s schooling and labor decisions,
respectively. The terms 
i ε
 and  i μ  are error terms for the two equations.
The objective is to measure how the probability of schooling structurally
affects the decision to work. Hence, the empirical challenge of this paper is the
identification of variables that are distinct between schooling and labor.10 The
estimates of the above equations are only possible if there is at least one indepen-
dent variable in the schooling equation but not in the labor equation. Based on the
theoretical model, factors that affect the household’s ability to “subsidize” their
children to school make the schooling decisions distinct. The child characteristics
determine to some extent how parents may be distributing the assets to their
children, e.g., girls may be given more assets than the boys. Community variables
refer to some measures of accessibility to schooling. Finally, household assets
account for the resources or subsidies that households may invest in their children’s
schooling. In the theoretical model found in the previous section, the first equa-
tion explains the process that will lead to the formation of human capital stocks
within the household.
On the other hand, the decision to participate in the labor market in turn is
determined by factors that affect the market wages and the reservation wages of
the children. In addition to child, household and community variables, predicted
schooling (based on the estimates of the schooling equation) captures the inabil-
ity of the household to gain access to some assets that support their schooling
expenditures. Thus, it accounts for the assets that will potentially raise the reser-
9 This suggests that child labor decisions are separable from the overall consumption-schooling decisions
and are considered ancillary or an outcome of this process. Previous empirical models have not
considered this possibility, and have not identified the schooling from the labor decisions (see Lanzona
2005 for a review of the empirical analyses on child labor in the Philippines).
10 A two-stage empirical model is required since the error terms,  i ε  and  i μ , are correlated. The
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vation wages of keeping children in school, and out of the labor market. The
presence of such variables raises the opportunity cost of working.
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND DATA
In general, the Philippines has achieved significant gains in terms of access to
education. Enrolment in the elementary and the high school system has expanded
by 2.5 and 3 percent per annum, respectively, from 1985 to 1998. This means that
the growth of enrolment in basic education is greater than the population growth,
a significant feat considering that the country has one of the highest population
growth rates in the world. In effect, the country registered a participation rate of  95
percent at the elementary level, while in the secondary level a participation rate of
64 percent in school year (SY) 1997–98, from 85 percent and 55 percent, respec-
tively, in SY 1990–91.
Reyes et al. (1999) however shows lower enrolment rates and higher drop
out rates as the primary effects of the Asian financial crisis in 1998. This is
specially so in the depressed communities such as the urban poor, sustenance
farming, and upland and fishing communities. Among the reasons cited were the
financial difficulties, inability to cope with higher tuition rates and school
expenses, higher out-of-pocket expenses (e.g., transportation and school projects),
and the need to give priority to more essential items such as food.
Households generally coped with the crisis by prioritizing expenditures to
essential items such as food since medical/health, education, transportation and
housing expenditures were beginning to cover a higher proportion of their
incomes. To meet their financial needs, majority of the households surveyed
resorted to borrowing, or availing of credit, mostly from the informal sectors or
from relatives and friends. Some households had no choice but to raise cash by
selling assets when credit was no longer available.
In trying to keep up with these expenses at a limited budget, education
became the first casualty. In this case, education was the first asset that
households were willing to give up. The increase in drop out incidence was
more prevalent in public secondary schools compared to elementary and
private secondary schools. Based on the government’s administrative reports,
there was a slight growth in enrolment rates in public elementary schools
between SY 1997–98 to 1998–99, but a considerable decline for the secondary
level. There was, however, a decline in enrolment in Grade 1, and a slowdown
in the first year high school level (Reyes et al. 1999). This implies that households
have postponed the enrolment of new entrants both to elementary and secondary
levels. Furthermore, enrolment in private schools showed significant decreases,
perhaps due to household decisions to transfer their children from private to
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These changes in education during the financial crisis can also be attributed
to the significant movements in the labor market. Lamberte and Yap (1999) noted
that many manufacturing companies resorted to cutting down work hours or days
to minimize losses while some implemented cost-cutting measures like freezing of
salary increases, imposing forced vacation, and enforcing compressed work week.
A few firms also implemented salary cuts. Because of this situation, many house-
holds who lost their jobs sought some part-time work, mainly in retail and doing
odd jobs. There was an observed increase in the number of women looking for
jobs or undertaking self-employment mechanisms such as direct selling or retail. In
some households, children were made to work either as laborers (for the boys) or
as domestic helpers (for the girls).
These observations clearly show the plausibility of our assumptions and
conclusions. The effects of the income shocks on household welfare, particularly
in education, food consumption, work decisions and savings, are clearly evident
from the observations. It may also be asserted that much of these results are due
to the inadequacy of social protection, particularly the subsidies on schooling
that would have lowered the opportunity cost of the education. Hence, given the
importance of education in the distribution of income and the ability to obtain
higher wages, the presence of social protection that are tied to schooling will
contribute significantly in reducing poverty.
The key issue in the study is the possible tradeoff between schooling and
child labor. One of the main arguments against child labor is its potential to substi-
tute for schooling as one of the children’s daily activities. The results of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) survey (shown in Table 3) indicate that only 28.8
percent of those who reported “worked” were not studying within the last 12
months at the time of the survey. However, the same table also reveals that 40
percent of the children in the survey were still taking their elementary schooling.
The next highest proportion of students consisted of those who were still in high
school (at 32 percent). This suggests that a substantial number of those working
were still studying to complete their elementary or secondary schooling. At the
same time, the proportion of those children who had dropped out was higher than
those who already completed these levels: 42 percent for elementary and 51
percent for high school. The above data indicate that those who finished either
elementary or secondary schooling, but were unable to move to a higher level of
schooling, were more prone to engage in child labor. This may seem to indicate the
absence of opportunities for children to embark on a higher level of schooling.
One difficulty with Table 3 is setting up control factors for the demand for
labor. The table may only be capturing the supply of child work. As they
completed either elementary or high schooling, the wages offered may have offset
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particularly favor those who completed their degrees, and offer higher wage rates.
Hence, while a number of students may have wanted to stop their schooling (due
to foreseen lack of opportunities for even higher education), the wages offered
may not be commensurate to the opportunity cost of not going to school.
Table 3. Household survey: number of children, highest grade completed, worked and
studied, 2001
                                    Number of
Highest Grade Completed / Studied        Working                       Percentage
                                   Children
Total 4,017,886 100.00
- Studied 2,857,383 71.12
- Did not study 1,160,503 28.88
No grade 115,741 2.88
- Studied 62,478 53.98
- Did not study 53,263 46.02
Elementary level 1,608,268 40.03
- Studied 1,186,937 73.80
- Did not study 421,331 26.20
Elementary graduate 712,850 17.74
- Studied 413,243 57.97
- Did not study 299,607 42.03
HS level 1,291,346 32.14
- Studied 1,044,260 80.87
- Did not study 247,086 19.13
HS graduate 258,827 6.44
- Studied 125,854 48.62
- Did not study 132,973 51.38
College Undergraduate 30,855 0.77
- Studied 24,611 79.76
- Did not study 6,244 20.24
Source: NSO 2001 Survey of Children
To get a better sense of the demand for child labor, one can examine working
children who left their parental home. These data involve cases where the demand
for child labor already exists, and the children in some period or another have
responded to this demand. Table 4 shows that roughly 79 percent of these children
who reported work at the time of the survey were not studying. Moreover, it seems
that the higher the level of schooling completed, the lower the probability of
dropping school. The percentage of children disclosing work decreases substan-
tially as they reach 10 years of schooling (or as they reach and graduate high
school). Thus, in cases where the demand for child labor is present, the employers
of child labor seem to prefer those with lower years of schooling. Again, this
seems to point out that increasing access to higher education is correlated with
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Table 4. Child living away from home: number of children, highest grade completed,
studied and worked, 2001
Highest Grade Completed / Number of Working %
Studied Children
 Total 170,533 100
- Studied 36,372 21.33
- Did not study 134,162 78.67
No grade 2,448 1.44
- Studied - -
- Did not study 2,448 100
Elementary level 48,856 28.65
- Studied 9,882 20.23
- Did not study 38,974 79.77
Elementary graduate 38,233 22.42
- Studied 3,857 10.09
- Did not study 34,377 89.91
HS level 54,752 32.11
- Studied 16,572 30.27
- Did not study 38,179 69.73
HS graduate 25,988 15.24
- Studied 5,804 22.33
- Did not study 20,184 77.67
College Undergraduate 257 0.15
- Studied 257 100
- Did not study - -
Source:  National Statistics Office, 2001 Survey of Children
Table 5 provides some indication of child workers who has dropped out
or stopped schooling altogether. A number of observations are important.
First, two in every five working children 5 to 17 years old stopped/dropped
out of school. Second, the ratio of male working children to female working
children in terms of dropouts was 2 to 1. Third, the highest dropout rates are
found for those who completed their primary and secondary schooling. The above
findings in Table 5 seem to correspond with Table 4. These observations provide
some evidence of the tradeoff between schooling and child work, as indicated in
the empirical model.
Table 5. Household survey: number of children ever stopped or dropped out of school,
sex and highest grade completed
Both Sexes
Total 3,906,268 1,467,318 2,438,950
- No grade 107,675 26,603 81,072
- Elementary level 1,581,151 629,210 951,942
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Table 5 continued









- Elementary graduate 681,204 331,208 349,996
- HS level 1,254,296 364,147 890,149
- HS graduate 251,975 110,634 141,341
- College
Undergraduate 29,966 5,516 24,450
Male
Total 2,480,628 1,038,402 1,442,226
- No grade 72,862 21,673 51,190
- Elementary level 1,087,776 479,809 607,967
- Elementary graduate 432,868 235,585 197,283
- HS level 742,449 237,962 504,486
- HS graduate 129,296 60,426 68,869
- College
Undergraduate 15,378 2,946 12,432
Female
Total 1,425,639 428,916 996,723
- No grade 34,813 4,930 29,883
- Elementary level 493,375 149,400 343,975
- Elementary graduate 248,336 95,623 152,713
- HS level 511,848 126,185 385,663
- HS graduate 122,679 50,208 72,471
- College
Undergraduate 14,589 2,570 12,018
Source: National Statistics Office, 2001 Survey of Children
RESULTS OF THE ECONOMETRIC TESTS
Table 6 features the list of variables used in the regression analysis. Based on the
model, the model consists of household, community and individual variables.
Means and standard deviations are based on the 2001 Survey on Children. One
particular weakness of the model is its inability to measure poverty accurately
using the data on the levels of household income. An alternative is to measure
extreme poverty using the threshold of PhP 5,000 per month irrespective of the
number of household members.11
Table 7 presents the regression coefficients and t-values of the logit
estimates for the probability of dropping school. A probit estimate is used since
the dependent variable is limited between zero and one. Using maximum likelihood,
the method considers the occurrence and nonoccurrence of the event through a
11 Using the number of household members as an independent variable is not considered in the empirical
model because this is assumed to be endogenous. Including this variable in the estimates will not explain
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12 The estimates are also corrected for sampling design. When any sampling method other than simple
random sampling is used, survey data analysis needs to be performed to take into account the differences
between the design that was used and simple random sampling. The sampling design can possibly
affects the calculation of the standard errors of the estimates. If the sampling design is ignored, e.g., if
simple random sampling is assumed when another type of sampling design was used, the standard
errors will likely be underestimated, possibly leading to results that seem to be statistically significant,
when in fact, they are not.









-  Highest Education
Obtained
-  Poor Health
Family Characteristics
-  Poverty
-  Father’s age
-  Mother’s age
-  Father’s education
-  Mother’s education
Household Assets
-  Monthly expenditure
-  Monthly rental income
-  Agricultural land
-  Other land





Reported work: 1=Yes, 0=No
Reported dropping out of school: 1=Yes, 0=No
Age in years
Gender: 1=Female, 0=Male
Levels of Schooling: 0=No grade completed,
1=Elementary Undergraduate, 2=Elementary
Graduate, 3=High School Undergraduate,
4=High School, 5=College Undergraduate
Personal assessment of Health Condition:
1=Poor, 0=Not Poor
Income Poverty: 1=If household income is less
than P5,000 per month, 0=otherwise
Father’s age in years
Mother’s age in years
Father’s Education in years
Mother’s Education in years




Monthly income from rent in pesos
Ownership of agricultural land: 1=Yes,
0=No
Ownership of other land: 1=Yes, 0=No
Ownership of other assets aside from land:
1=Yes, 0=No









































chance mechanism determined by a probability.12 The coefficients show the
effect of the regressors on the probability of dropping school at some time in the
children’s lives. Individual characteristics such as age, highest grade attained,
and health conditions are all significant factors in the decision to continue
or discontinue schooling.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 236
Children seem to have an increasing propensity to drop out of school
as they become older perhaps due to increasing labor market opportunities.
With higher education, however, the probability of dropping school is decreased
since the family may be more willing to invest in children who have already
reached a high level of schooling. In the same manner, boys also have a
greater tendency to drop schooling since girls are perhaps given more assets
to complete their schooling. Parents in effect may prefer to invest more in the
schooling of girls than with boys. This means that greater schooling incentives
should be offered to children, particularly to boys, while they are still young,
and as more income opportunities are offered to them as they get older, they
will then have attained a higher level of schooling. By this time, opportunity
costs of dropping out of school are fairly high.
Table 7. Probit model estimates for dropping school





























Number of observations = 65,219 F-test=38.80
Note: 1) Figures in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t-values.
2) **,* refer to 5 percent and 1 percent levels of degree of confidence, respectively.ALDABA, LANZONA AND TAMANGAN 237
The variable poor health is used in the absence of any data on health facili-
ties.13 Estimates show that poor health implies a lower likelihood of dropping
school. This can mean that accessibility to health facilities or investments in health
is a key factor in the decision whether children stay in school or not. These
findings on education and health seem to confirm the hypothesis that greater
availability of human facilities will cause households to invest more in further
building their human capital. Complementarities between schooling and health
investments can thus be found.
Other variables are used to assess the importance of household assets in
the decision to continue schooling. Children born to more educated fathers show
a greater tendency to drop schooling, and those living in households with greater
assets and nonagricultural land tend to stay longer in schools. These findings
support the hypothesis that access to assets lead to greater schooling. The acces-
sibility to funds or credit for schooling may thus be more available with more
durable assets and greater incomes.
Table 8 presents three specifications of the probit estimates for child work.
The first specification considers simply the child, household and community vari-
ables that affect both the reservation wages of and offered wages to the child. The
first four variables are often used in the Mincer equation to estimate wages. Wages
are expected to increase with age (though nonlinearly) and with education, as the
older and educated children are expected to have higher reservation wages. Re-
sults show the expected signs for age. With greater experience, wages are ex-
pected to rise to some extent until some diminishing productivity with age sets in.
Consequently, as shown by the results, the probability of work increases initially
and then decreases with rising ages.
The result for highest education obtained is rather surprising. With higher
education, wages are expected to be higher, causing a substitution effect away
from leisure and other activities toward work activities. However, the coefficient
seems to indicate that education also has an asset or income effect that reduces
the child’s propensity to engage in child work.
The results also indicate that boys are offered higher wages than the girls,
thereby inducing them to engage more in the labor market. At the same time, there
may also be some asset factor effects incorporated in these coefficients since as
observed in the previous estimates on schooling, parents seem to invest more in
13 The model assumes the exogeneity of health when in reality it is endogenous. Nonetheless, the
decision to include health in the specification can be justified empirically since the coefficients and
standard deviations of variables are the same when the variable was excluded as when these are
included. Admittedly, further work will be needed to clearly identify this variable in the same way that the
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their daughters in terms of education. In which case, the reservation wages of the
girls are higher.
Income poverty is also another factor that captures the reservation wages of
the children. Those living in the lower income bracket (less than P5,000 monthly)
are considered extremely poor. In this case, their reservation wages are lower, and
children belonging to these households have a greater propensity to engage in
Table 8.  Probit model estimates for working
Dependent Variable: Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Reporting for work Coefficients Coefficients   Coefficients
Age 0.4291** 0.4968** 0.4372**
 (3.71) (3.91) (3.74)
Age squared -0.0079 -0.0183** -0.0081
 (1.61) (3.13) (1.63)
Sex -0.3970** -0.1950** -0.4035
 (5.07) (1.99) (4.84)
Highest education obtained -0.1886** 0.1321** -0.1995**
 (4.94) (2.08) (5.39)
Poverty 0.2861* 0.2689 0.2372
 (1.74) (1.61) (1.42)
Region -0.0037 -0.0036 -0.0037
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.42)
Rural 0.3507** 0.3282** 0.3339**
 (4.22) (3.96) (3.91)
Monthly expenditures 0.1377** 0.1348** 0.1176*
 (2.08) (2.00) (1.75)
Father’s age -0.0108 -0.0043 -0.0108
 (1.40) (0.61) (1.35)
Mother’s age -0.0031 -0.004 -0.0034
 (0.33) (0.42) (0.36)
Father’s education -0.0119** -0.0066* -0.0117**
 (3.07) (1.86) (2.84)
Mother’s education -0.0372* -0.0223 -0.0354
 (1.67) (1.49) (1.59)
Predicted rate of dropping out   4.0725**  
   (6.73)  
Poor Health    11.7208**
     (48.68)
Other assets    0.0555
     (0.55)
Rental income    0.000001
     (0.12)
Other land    -0.0198
     (0.15)
Agricultural land    0.2112**
     (2.31)
Constant 4.3982** 4.9904** 4.4224**
 (5.22) (5.23) (5.19)
No. of observations 65,219 65,219 65,219
F-test 36.63 35.45 953.78
Note: 1) Figures in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t-values.
         2) **,* refer to 5 percent and 1 percent levels of degree of confidence, respectively.ALDABA, LANZONA AND TAMANGAN 239
the labor market. The results thus show that those who reside in poor households
have a greater likelihood of working.
The next set of variables included is meant to capture the community vari-
ables that will reduce the transaction or information costs of engaging in the labor
market and increase the opportunities of work. Results show that residing in the
rural areas increase the likelihood of engaging in the labor market. Casual agricul-
tural labor arrangements—as opposed to contractual arrangements—are more
predominant in rural areas, and these are perhaps the types of activities child
workers engaged in.
The last set of variables is aimed to capture the set of available assets that
influence the reservation wages of households. In the absence of an overall index
for good household assets and nonwage income, the level of monthly expenditure
is used as a proxy variable for the household’s fixed assets. The results indicate
that the families with more fixed assets tend to have more children working. This is
consistent with results in other studies showing that the households operating
small-scale enterprises have a greater incidence of child labor (e.g., Esguerra
2002;Villamil 2002).
Another type of asset is the parents’ education. The estimates indicate
that children with more educated parents are less likely to work. Greater education
for the parents ultimately leads to more resources which draws children away
from working.
The second specification incorporates the predicted dropout rates using
the estimates found in Table 7. A number of notable changes can be observed.
First, the effects of age factors are increased. This can be due to the observed fact
that parents intend to invest less on older children. This factor then pulls down the
overall coefficients of age and age squared found in the first specification. Sec-
ond, the effect of sex is significantly lower in absolute value. As shown in the
previous results, parents prefer to invest less in their sons for their education.
Hence, the greater difference found between boys and girls in the first specifica-
tion can be attributed to this preference for asset formation. Third, education,
measured by the highest grade obtained, is observed to have a complete shift in
the sign in the second specification. The asset or income effects of education, i.e.,
the preference of parents to provide more assets to their already educated
children, are now controlled with incorporation of the predicted dropout rate.14
14 The high correlation between the predicted dropout rate and highest schooling level obtained can also
be seen simply because higher dropout rates ultimately lead to lower schooling. However, in this
estimate, the correlation is really between greater schooling obtained and the greater assets for schooling
which the predicted dropout rate essentially captures. Hence, the interpretation of asset effects is consid-
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The coefficient in the second specification only reflects the expected substitu-
tion effect arising from higher education or higher wages, drawing children
towards more work. Fourth, the effect of income poverty is smaller and now
statistically insignificant. Income poverty for this particular sample is correlated
with the household asset formation on education. This means that addressing
the household’s basic needs for education will influence both poverty and child
work simultaneously.15 Fifth, the effect of parent’s education is now lower and
less significant. This can be attributed to the high negative association between
parents’ education and the probability of dropping out of school.
The effect of the probability of dropping out of school on child work is
seen to have the most substantial effect. The assets invested for the schooling
of the child results in an increase in the reservation wages of the child. Thus, a
one percent decrease in the likelihood of dropping is thus expected to lead to a
four percent reduction in the propensity of children to work. The key factor then
that will help to mitigate child labor will be the creation of assets that will be used
specifically to the formation of education.
The third specification is an attempt merely to determine whether the asset
formation (including those affecting schooling) is simultaneously decided with
child labor decisions, as is assumed by the recent empirical work. If this assump-
tion were true, the incorporation of key variables that influenced asset formation
should cause significant shifts or changes in the estimated coefficients found in
the first specification. Interpretation should look at how these factors will affect
both decisions, causing changes in the statistical tests as more variables are
included.
Otherwise, asset formation (as well as predicted dropout rates) and child
work decisions are separable, as is assumed by this paper where decisions in the
former recursively influence the latter, but not vice versa. Note that, except for
poverty and monthly expenditures (which is used as a proxy for fixed assets), all
the coefficients in the first specification are largely left untouched. Poverty is
not significant for the simple reason that these are correlated with the other
incorporated variables. Monthly expenditures are also expected to have a less
significant effect because of their high association with fixed assets. Other than
these points, no new information is added from the first specification.
Two points are also interesting. First, the ownership of agricultural land,
which is significant in this third specification, has no influence on the other
variables (aside from being perhaps negatively correlated with income poverty).
Second, poor health surprisingly leads to more work. This, nonetheless, can be
15 This result should, however, be qualified since variable for income poverty can still be improved.ALDABA, LANZONA AND TAMANGAN 241
interpreted more accurately in terms of the availability of health facilities as is
assumed in the paper. Poor health facilities lead to fewer investments in school-
ing and, thus, more child work.
SUMMARY AND MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS
The econometric analysis using a two-stage process reveal that the following are
the determinants of the probability of child work: Child’s Age (positive), Child’s
Age squared (negative), Being Male (positive), Highest Grade Completed (posi-
tive), Predicted Dropout rates (positive).  Other community variables like the pres-
ence of a recruiter (positive) and whether the work is within the community (posi-
tive) also determine the probability of child work. Note that the effect of the
probability of dropping out of school on child work is seen to have the most
substantial effect. An important finding is that poverty is a necessary but not
sufficient determinant of child work.16 In this light, the key factor that will help
eliminate or mitigate child labor, to say the least, will be the creation of assets that
will be used specifically in the formation of education and schooling. Thus, the
overall condition of the educational system can be a powerful factor on the supply
of child labor. This also means that addressing the household’s basic needs for
education influence poverty and child work simultaneously.
Poverty reduction programs that are fairly inexpensive need to be priori-
tized. When an element of any poverty reduction alleviation leads to the reduction
of child labor, the program would likely incorporate various forms of assistance
given to families that provide children better options for the use of their time,
including schooling. Integrating all of these elements into an overall poverty
reduction program allows for a better utilization of the government budget.
The results of the empirical analysis indicate that the reduction of child labor
(and simultaneously poverty) cannot be dissociated with household asset forma-
tion or their limited access to financial markets. Child labor is a result of two main
functions: the imperfection of capital markets (as shown in the theoretical frame-
work) in translating future earning-potential into present spending; and the inabil-
ity of parents to provide the necessary assets to their children. If the parents are
able to bequeath debts to their children, they can in effect borrow against their
children’s future earnings in order to pay the present expenses.
In which case, the use of short-term credit to induce schooling and to
eliminate child labor might be hard to implement. The ideal policy then is for
children themselves to borrow against their future and to pay these debts later
16 Deb and Rosati (2002) even show that poorer households have a higher propensity to send their
children to school and not work. In addition, they emphasize that there are other unobservables affecting
household decision to send a child to work or school.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 242
with future education-enhanced earnings. Since the private sector is not expected
to foresee such long-term gains, the state or multinational agencies can establish
these forms of capital markets and attract funds from individuals, institutions and
other governments. Children, or more likely parents on their behalf, can sign
promissory notes to repay educational stipends during their working lives. Also,
poor families affected by substantial migration, can require assurances that the
beneficiaries of such loans would use their state-funded skills at home rather than
moving abroad, or that they would send back remittances to the government to
pay for their debts.ALDABA, LANZONA AND TAMANGAN 243
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